Mapping the Public -Private Law Divide: A hybrid approach to corporate accountability
I. Introduction
Holding multinational corporations (MNCs) responsible for harm caused to private individuals and groups has often seen such victims resort to traditional common law redress in tort. Actions brought under the Alien Torts Claim Act (1789) have seen a swathe of cases against MNCs (Doe v Unocal, 2002; AMZ et al v Total, 2007) . In light of the Kiobel (2013) case, the age of extra-territorial claims, at least against foreign violations and companies in the US, is at an end. That said, the private law redress system was imperfect: challenges with statute of limitations barring claims (Girca v IBM, 2006) ; lack of local judicial infrastructure or expertise to bring a domestic claim in developing countries (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Zerk, 2014, p. 49) ; difficulties establishing liability of parent companies for violations committed by subsidiaries; characterisation of gross violations of human rights as torts or delicts (Zerk, 2014, 45; Moffett, 2014, p. 10) ; and inadequate remedy of damages where MNCs are found responsible for violations (Malamud-Grosi and Grosman, 2006, p. 545) . We suggest exploring what can be learnt from public international law through an international reparations court, given the private law challenges in capturing the scale of such violations, the responsibility of MNCs and effective remedies to victims.
Although a number of complementary perspectives on corporate accountability, such as sanctions and regulations, exist, this article concentrates on the lesser-discussed remedial aspect. We focus on remedies for victims or affected external stakeholders from human rights violations arising from a corporation's behaviour that is either in breach of obligations or does not sit well with endeavours to act in a responsible manner. Human rights discourse typically makes reference to victims, whereas in corporate governance literature, local communities or those affected by corporate environmental disaster are more likely to be referred to as 'external stakeholders'. It is in marrying these two areas of law (ultimately speaking about the same issues) that this article is situated. While this article discusses the energy extractive industry in particular -due to its high profile impact on individuals (such as the Deepwater Horizon spill), communities, and the environment -the points raised are applicable to other industries responsible for gross violations of human rights. Our concern for those affected by the energy extractive industry is heightened by structural limitations, as such individuals and communities are often the most marginalised and vulnerable groups in a country, with little political power, such as indigenous groups. Most of the world's natural resources are located in traditionally 'lesser developed regions' in development narratives (Frank, 1991) . Many of these countries can be dependent on foreign direct investment for growth and development; this, in addition to limited laws, regulations and policies, characterises an underdeveloped accountability framework in ensuring robust regulations at a regional and national level.
In public international law there has been a general trend since the Second World War that has seen the advancement of human rights law, and to a lesser extent, international criminal justice. This period has witnessed a proliferation of international and regional courts to adjudicate on violations committed by states and individuals. The attention to international monitoring and compliance through international courts is due to states' inability or unwillingness to effectively redress issues and violations that are of an international concern, such as gross violations of human rights. With the rise in power of non-state actors, such as MNCs and non-state armed groups, violations committed by such entities can fall outside the capacity and willingness of the state to hold them to account and the traditional state-centric international human rights bodies, unless individual leaders are brought before international criminal justice mechanisms.
We propose an international reparations court that can hold states, multinational corporations and other non-state actors responsible for violations which shock the conscious of humanity. While the International Criminal Court has been established to address individual criminal responsibility of those most heinous international crimes, there is an accountability gap for violations that fall outside the Court's jurisdictional parameters and capacity. An international reparations court would be more victim-centered, enabling redress for violations perpetrated by collective entities, rather than individuals. It would overcome the pitfalls of private litigation occurring in a number of countries against MNCs, offering victims a more discrete mechanism to tackle the complex evidential, procedural and jurisdictional challenges of atrocities facilitated and perpetrated by non-state actors.
This article begins by exploring the responsibility of multinational corporations through the lenses of corporate social responsibility and international law, before discussing the bridging of these two legal regimes through the quasi private-public development of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The subsequent section examines remedies in public law for violations committed by multinational corporations, how these are constructed against the state and how the accountability gap can be better addressed through an international court of reparations, which can hold states and corporations alike responsible for gross violations of human rights. It is hoped that a discussion of remedies for such abuses can contribute to a more coherent accountability of corporations through the examination of remedies that is not pigeonholed into the private/public law dichotomy.
II. Responsibility of Multinational Corporations
MNCs are a product of the Western orientated capitalist liberal model, their power increasing exponentially since the Cold War. As the wealth and power of these corporations develop, states' power to regulate MNCs has comparatively weakened. This is due to the ability of corporations to operate across borders; while mechanisms by which their behaviour is regulated remains grounded at national or federal levels. With the apparent power shifts at a global level between business and states, there is an increasing demand for corporations to offer more to society than profit accumulation for shareholders. This section will address how corporations themselves aim to be responsible actors in society, before considering international laws that may be used (with varying degrees of success) to hold corporations to account if they fail to fulfil their responsibilities/obligations to society. Finally, this section will consider the 2011 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Ruggie Principles) , the most recent guidelines in place to reframe state and business responsibility, and the remedies that may be invoked where they breach their obligations.
A. Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR is featured primarily within Anglo-American governance systems and as such this article focuses primarily on the Anglo-American scholarship in the area (McBarnet, 2005, p. 205) . Originally designed by companies as a means of self-regulation, it is increasingly used by corporations as a way to contribute to the social good of the region in which it operates and to an extent, avoid more rigorous government level regulation. In recent years, there has been a move, in some jurisdictions, to regulate the scope and extent of CSR activities through, for example: US state level constituency statutes and industry level standards (such as the International Council of Mining and Metals). This has been met with varied degrees of success. Mostly, this remains closely aligned to the 'light-touch' regulatory characteristics of the usually Anglo, but also American, governance regime. Throughout this piece, reference is made to both the Anglo and American regimes (and their associated understanding and regulation of CSR style practice). We tend to focus primarily on the Angloversion of CSR for reasons outlined below. The potential of CSR has been lauded by many, with Carroll (1999, p.292) noting that it, 'has a bright future, because, at its core, it addresses and captures the most important concerns of the public regarding business and society relationships.' As the idea of CSR has developed it has begun to embrace a wider protection of rights, including human rights. This article therefore seeks to explore the routes by which MNCs can be held accountable for their damaging activities within the extractive industries in particular.
Ideas of individual responsibility are well documented (Collins and Hoyt, 1972) . Within the context of human rights abuses by corporations, the limitations of individual responsibility mechanisms lie in the small number of human rights violations that amount to crimes within the context of individual responsibility; notably 'true atrocities' such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Ratner and Abrams, 2001) . Less developed, and more controversial, is the concept of collective responsibility associating blame with a group and situating moral responsibilities in the collective actions taken by these groups. Some questions do arise around whether the components (individuals) have the same value set individually as collectively in order to be a robust moral agent of the group.
When looking at the corporation, the value set is to produce profit. This is a universal and primary aim of the group -producing profit for shareholders. Another (lesser) aim is protecting stakeholders/victims from corporate action/abuses. Thus this becomes a value of the corporation (usually articulated through CSR policies) and it is one to which they can be held to account.
Corporations are ideal candidates for this understanding of collective responsibility given the structural organisation of the company with an identifiable moral agent (the board) and articulated group intentions (profit/CSR/sustainable development etc.). It is within this understanding of the relationship between human rights and CSR that this debate can be situated. Corporations must be held collectively responsible for human rights infringements, as human rights and related protections are articulated within a company's CSR policy -therefore, a value set of the company. Thus, we advocate an understanding of responsibility for human rights violations under the collective responsibility of the corporation.
CSR can, and has been used as an accountability mechanism when companies do not meet their responsibilities. Increasingly included within this are human rights issues. However, the language around and regulation of CSR is vague, particularly so when talking about remedying corporate abuses or indeed when CSR has failed. Existing laws focus on punishing the company rather than offering a remedy to the victim. This section of the article therefore addresses CSR as an accountability mechanism, as well as how it is characterised and complemented within the Extractive industries, finishing with a focus on the tentative relationship between CSR and remedies. It becomes despairingly clear that despite a plethora of CSR literature and attempts to evolve and revolutionize the concept; a multitude of codes, principles, standards laws and regulations; those who suffer the most from corporate abuses are those left inadequately protected by the industry solution to the 'social' role of the corporation in light of these governance shifts.
This subsection will address the evolution of CSR, and how it can be understood through a range of inter-disciplinary interpretations of business, globalisation and the global system. Whereas we recognise that much has been written in this area as it relates to global regulatory governance, global administrative law and societal constitutionalism, we believe that a consideration of the interplay between companies responsibilities as articulated by their CSR policy and human rights protections is timely given the discussions emerging post the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. With the article's focus on the energy extractive industries, we will use this sector as a base to understand both the development of CSR as it relates to human rights, and its shortcomings. These criticisms will be centred particularly round the idea that CSR provides corporations with tools to legitimise their actions and activities in the region in which they operate -the 'licence to operate'.
Although recognising the flaws of the Anglo-American conceptualisation of CSR, we posit that due to EU communication embracing the Anglo trajectory of CSR (2011), it is necessary to consider how this manifestation of CSR can be best used to protect from human rights violations. Traditionally, the norms and laws that bound nation-states, were not extended to corporations (Teubner, 2004, p.3) . In apparent recognition of the shift in governance structures, there is a move towards 'an interplay between national, international, public and private law systems in allocating and competing for regulatory power' (Backer, 2006, p.288 (Backer, 2006, p.294) . This is evident in both soft and hard law mechanisms discussed below through the lens of the energy extractive industries, and in particular the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
1. The evolution of CSR CSR has evolved according to market needs and requirements; aligning with market patterns and through societal interpretations of the concept. As a result, a distinct evolutionary trajectory can be traced from early inceptions of the philanthropic businessman (as lauded by Bowen, 1953; Friedman 1970 and notable in the judgment of Dodge v Ford Motor Company, 1919; Hutton v West Cork Railway, 1883) to the more self-regulatory functions of the company together with the inclusion of the 'public interest' into corporate decision making. Indeed, the increased role of business within the wider governance sphere has meant that the lines between business, government and society have become increasingly blurred leading to an increased expectation that the corporation will commit to stakeholders beyond the bottom line of profit maximisation.
The failure to concretely define the concept has allowed for this shift to occur, with common understandings of CSR described as "the social responsibility of business encompasses the economic legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that society has of organisations in any given point in time" (Carroll, 1979, p . 500 emphasis added); to an action that appears to further some social good (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) to the benchmark of the socially conscious business movement (Carroll, 2015, p. 87) . This is both the measure of, and the failure for the effectiveness of CSR as a concept -it is able to adapt to new pressures placed by each generation -hence the shift in the last number of years in the relationship between CSR and human rights and also to the sustainability movement but it does mean that concerns around legitimacy and accountability arise insofar as the concept becomes somewhat 'tortured' (Godfrey et al, 2010 ) prompting a number of criticisms.
As the concept evolved so too did the criticisms of CSR. Key criticisms that have typically tortured the CSR ideology have included the fact that the company, for the benefit of the company, has designed CSR policies. Taking this a bit further, the purpose of a corporation is profit maximisation.
A 'social' benefit can only ever be to secondary to the primary aim of capital return, as without capital return, the corporation cannot survive. This suggests then that there are tiers of responsibility within the corporation: the primary responsibility is to shareholders and profit (the economic responsibility outlined by Carroll, 1979) ; the secondary responsibility is to what management literature typically refers to as internal stakeholders (employees, supply chains etc.) and their responsibilities as shaped by the law (and thus the legal responsibilities outlined by Carroll); and finally, the tertiary responsibility is to external stakeholders such as local communities, governments, media and the environment. This is the more philanthropic or ethical angle of Carroll's triangle and although some developments have occurred both within the soft-law angle and more concrete responsibilities, the 'value' of these to the company can be measured on the impact that the plight of these stakeholders will have on the shareholders. Indeed, although existing laws and regulations do recommend certain sanctions against the corporation for corporate failures, a key trend is the failure to offer any concrete guarantees of remedy to the affected stakeholder-especially within this tertiary group of responsibilities. Further, the blurring of the line between CSR and PR has led to some problems for CSR. The BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico has highlighted that the admission of responsibility is no longer enough for consumers in order to assuage the company's accountability. Companies need to be doing something to right the wrong they, or their agents, have created. Providing a remedy to the victim for their action or inaction is one way that this can be achieved.
Themes permeated the evolution of CSR including for example, the definitional era in the 1960s, to the empirical studies of the 1970s, to the role of corporate citizenship and corporate social performance in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, the role of business within human rights, together with the impact of the MNC on the environment has commanded the interest of academics and practitioners alike. One such industry facing criticism and commentary on both these fronts (human rights failures and environmental concerns) has been the Energy Extractive Industry -the focus of this article.
Characterising CSR within the Energy Extractive Industry
As CSR has evolved, so too has the manner in which CSR is regarded within the governance sphere.
In analysing the language used by NGOs and not-for-profits, Blowfield alludes to a conceptual shift in both the requirements of business in society and the role of business within governance: 'CSR is now intertwined with international development and related goals of poverty alleviation and sustainability' (2005, p. 515) As CSR becomes an ever more integral part of the corporate governance structure, and as corporate governance is incorporated within the governance discourse, in tandem with theories around the Third Way in particular (Giddens, 1998 (Giddens, , 1999 (Giddens, , 2001 Wheeler, 2002) , there is now an increased participation by non-state actors in the designing and shaping of public policy (Shamir, 2011, p. 314) . In this section we speak of issues such as corruption, transparency, and noncompliance with environmental or other standards within the corporate sphere. Whereas we recognise that these are not necessarily gross human rights violations in themselves, we note that from these type of issues human rights violations may emerge as side-effects or as a consequence to irresponsibility in other areas.
Indeed, headline incidents within the Energy and Extractive Industries have motivated the evolution of CSR from Brent Spar (1995) prompting the launching of the social investment movement to the blood diamonds campaign (due to its relationship with civil wars) leading to the proliferation of corporate codes of conduct (See, Global Witness; The Kimberly Process; Grant and Taylor, 2004) . the fact that the initiative focuses on the revenue streams (and not those affected directly by the extraction industry) and relies on countries willingly participating. For those countries where the greatest 'rents' are being collected are those less willing to engage due to a weak civil society.
Developing on this point, the EITI assumes that all governments are equally developed and thus all governments are equally equipped to develop, organise and publicise the requisite documentation.
This is not the case and the challenge then that befalls EITI is retaining legitimacy as a soft-law initiative in spite of these problems. Perhaps this is where the company steps in. In recent years there has been a rise in popularity of the company-community grievance mechanism. In a way, these attempt to fill the gaps left by a weak government system. These company led initiatives are gaining traction within the oil, gas and mining industries for example, BP Azerbaijan (and the Baku -TbilisiCeyhan pipeline) and the Kaltim Prima Coal development in Indonesia. Whereas these are often heralded as a huge departure for stakeholder engagement, some challenges remain; specifically that they require a change in corporate culture, a fundamental shift in stakeholder engagement and conflict resolution (Wilson and Blackmore (eds), 2013) .
Scrutiny of the sector has also been intensified with the Equator Principles, which conduct environmental and social risk reviews that relate to project finance. They emerged as a way to manage the concerns of banks -these concerns being similar to those outlined above by Watt (2005) as related to CSR. From EP III, considerably more projects within the sector will be subject to the reporting requirements and to publicly disclose their environmental and social impact analysis. With the advances in the literature on business and human rights (as discussed below) the EPIII also emphasises the responsibility of the sector to move beyond human rights policies toward a much more embedded oversight of human rights impacts on the ground (Conley and Williams, 2011 ). The
Equator Principles show the general trend in shifting towards recognising the role of business in human rights protections but their effectiveness is again questionable.
Aside from these soft-law initiatives, some of the 'publish what you pay' objectives outlined in the EITI, for example, are gaining expression as hard law within the US, e.g., s.1502 (supply chain diligence) and s.1504 (transparency provision) Dodds-Frank Act (2010) . Forthcoming at EU level is the Accounting Directive (2013), to be implemented at state level from 2016, which will require companies (including the extraction industries) based in the EU to list, project by project, the finances of their operations. This has raised some questions, as some believe that it will be impossible to meet this requirement. Even with instruments, such as those discussed in the section, focussed on global energy extractive industries, the capacity for effective remedy within said instruments (and in company CSR policy) remains questionable. It would appear though that the CSR movement is viewed as the way for business to engage with societal issues. An underexplored area of CSR is the relationship between CSR and a remedy -namely, when the company has done wrong, and has been
held accountable -what recourse is there for the victim or affected stakeholder?
CSR and Remedies
The relationship between CSR and remedies is a tentative one. CSR is more of a defence, or preventative mechanism, a means by which companies can say 'but look what we are doing' where they are accused of human rights violations. It is one thing to expect a corporation to act in a responsible and ethical manner when it is not costing the company anything, but the question needs to be asked whether a corporation can be expected to compromise on profits to produce responsible good if competitors are not doing so, and if their shareholders are suffering as a result. For business, a number of 'priorities' come to the fore -competition, profit maximisation, and shareholder optimisation, to name a few. For an entity embedded in capitalism -and whose primary goal is profit accumulation -perhaps we need to rethink the expectations from capital accumulation in order to align management language, consumer expectations, and human rights discourse.
Nolan and Taylor (2009) are more sympathetic in recognising the relationship between human rights and CSR. The scope and extent of the relationship between the two is somewhat disjointed and illdefined due to barriers of language, jargon, and purpose. Even in writing this article, we recognise how we use different terminology to refer to the same roles -one articulating the human rights discourse, and the other that of corporate governance. Nolan and Taylor (2009) suggest it is through the common law that the inclusion of certain rights within the ambit of responsibility is then recognised. Recent developments have been primarily through soft law mechanisms and perhaps it is in respecting soft law (i.e. codes, principles, guidelines, etc.) that corporations are granted a social licence to operate. There is something of a regulatory shortfall here. Soft law lacks the teeth to bite into the real issues but, at the same time, it is arguably allowing corporations to 'taste' contentious issues for the first time. Common law and soft law mechanisms can perhaps be used in tandem to foster a more responsible, and accountable, energy extractive industries sector.
CSR can exist as a preventative measure. It is a self-regulatory means allowing corporations to act in a socially manner. The size of corporations and their transnational presence means that there is a regulatory shortfall when these organisations fail to act in a socially responsible manner. There are only limited ways by which nation-states can hold multinational corporations to account. Even when regulations and accountability mechanisms exist, their purpose seems to be to punish the corporation for wrongdoing and not to remedy the victim for loss suffered (FCPA, 1977; Dodd Franks, 2010; Accounting Directive, 2013) . CSR, despite its more social justice spin, still does reflect the capitalist orientated background of the concept, in the language used (stakeholder is much more clinical than victim) and the nature of accountability mechanisms. The next subsection looks at the scope of international law as it relates to human rights violations and how this may offer a remedy for affected stakeholders.
B. International Law and Human Rights
International law has historically been between states, which are treated as subjects with legal personality. Allowing them the power to draft and consent to international agreements that regulate their affairs and relationships with each other it contrasts with domestic law, as it goes beyond the internal affairs of a state to impinge upon the interests of other states and the international community as a whole, such as gross violations of human rights. (Pellet, 2011, p.15) .
Responsibility to provide a remedy where a duty is breached is connected to accountability, which is concerned with ensuring that those who are culpable for causing the violation are appropriately sanctioned (Kleffner, 2009, p. 240) . For the purpose of reparations this is not punitive, but to hold those individuals or organisation responsible to remedy the harm they have caused. Mallinder and McEvoy (2011) define accountability in broad terms as the constraint of power, with its narrower 'operationalisation' including common characteristics of, (1) there is an individual or institution that is capable of being held to account for their decisions, actions or omissions; (2) there is an individual or institution that is empowered to hold the decision-maker accountable; (3) that there is a process by which the decision-maker is required to disclose and explain their decision; and (4) that there is an enforcement process, in which the accountability actor can impose sanctions on decision-makers who violated their duties (p.109). Damage, 1971; Gauci, 1999) .
MNCs can also be responsible for human rights, beyond the 'responsibility to respect' discussed in the next section, to remedy gross violations of human rights. MNCs are not just considered objects of international law to which international obligations are imposed by the state, but can, in addition, be subjects with international legal personality, due to the serious breaches they can commit. By breaching such rules of international law it gives rise to obligations to cease and to remedy such violations (UNBPG, 2005) . Following the reasoning of the Nuremberg dictum that 'international crimes are committed by men, not abstract entities', responsibility of MNCs instead exists on the remedial plane. We focus on the remedial corporate responsibility of MNCs. This approach is unlikely to offend the precepts of international criminal justice, but reflects the role of the corporate entity of the MNC as not just responsible individuals, but through their resources, capacity, and/or policies collectively commit or facilitate gross violation of human rights.
Gross violations of human rights and the responsibility of MNCs
For the purposes of this article we use the following definition of gross violations to include 'genocide; slavery and slavery-like practices; summary or arbitrary executions; torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; enforced disappearance; arbitrary and prolonged detention; deportation or forcible transfer of population; and systematic discrimination, in particular based on race or gender' (Van Boven, 1993, para. 13) . These violations cause grave suffering to victims and can also impinge upon economic, social and cultural rights (ESC), as well as amount to gross violations of human rights where such violations of ESC rights take place on a 'large scale or targeted at particular population groups.' (OHCHR, 2012; Zerk, 2014, p. 25-29) . It is important to characterise such violations as gross or international crimes to reflect their gravity and severity of harm they cause to victims, so that when individuals or organisations are held to account for such violations it accurately acknowledges the serious suffering of victims (Deva, 2013, p. 97; Zerk, 2014 ).
The responsibility of MNCs is not absolute or autonomous in international law. The state remains the primary actor and duty-holder in international law, owing to its more permanent identity than MNCs (Kleffner, 2009, p. 265) . While governments may change, the identity and responsibility of the state under international law remains the same. The state, general speaking, has greater capacity and willingness to meet international obligations, such as human rights duties to ensure investigations of gross violations and fair trial rights. There is still a role for both private and public actors in remedying human rights violations. In broad terms, the current soft law standards under the Ruggie Principles reflect the authors' position in very diluted terms. It is perhaps through the enunciation of such principles that more binding norms can crystallise into realising the responsibility of MNCs for remedies at the international level.
C. Bridging the quasi-private/public law divide: The Ruggie Principles
Previous sections of this article bemoaned the regulatory shortfall in monitoring CSR, and the emerging legal personality of MNCs at the international level. Aside from a few select attempts of limited effectiveness, CSR has remained within the confines of the self-regulatory landscape of corporate governance with little codification in international law (Mitchell, 1992; Kaey, 2010; s. 172 (1) (d) Companies Act, 2006; Bradshaw, 2013; Zerk, 2014; Moffett, 2014) . At the international level, attempts to regulate MNCs were initiated with the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (2003) . In looking at the human rights element in particular, the identification of responsible actors in respecting human rights is outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognises the rights of all individuals to be respected by everyone and every entity, without limiting obligations to states (Clapham, 2010, p. 24) . The extent to which these rights are enforced is subjective in nature, due, in part, to the inadequacy of the state-centric system. As some states are more powerful and have a greater regulatory reach than others, there is an imbalance in justice when it comes to holding corporations to account. Due to this imbalance (and indeed, fostering the development of this imbalance), multinational corporations can forum shop and move their operations to other jurisdictions. Using a cost-benefit analysis it may be that relocation is a cost effective means of avoiding stringent regulation, enforcement, and remedies. This feeds into work on the 'development of underdevelopment' through reliance on FDI (Frank, 1991) . The idea supposes that in trying to attract and retain capital (and therefore development in the traditional growth indications), the regulatory structure is compromised in order to ensure that capital does not leave the region for a more regulatory friendly region.
There is a gradual shift in the discourse of 'responsibility' for human rights protection. Increasingly, (Preamble, 2003, emphasis added) to '[b] usiness enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved' (Ruggie Principles, 2011, Principle 11, emphasis added) indicates the unwillingness of the UN to alienate MNCs. Indeed, it is this devolution of human rights to market level language that, in essence encapsulates our reluctance to embrace the Ruggie Principles insofar as it offers sufficient remedy to victims. It is interesting to contrast the language used in the Ruggie principles with earlier work from Ruggie (Ruggie, 2007; Kytle and Ruggie, 2005) . By subsuming voluntary language into required obligations (i.e. the pillars) the value of the Ruggie Principles seems to lean pro-market as opposed to protecting victims. As a result, this approach comes at the expense of accountability, in terms of victims' access to redress and the enforcement of remedies. The shift in language is more akin to the principles approach advocated by CSR, as opposed to the more positive obligations that bind other actors in international law. Whereas many arguments are put forth elsewhere on the need for this compromise (Ruggie, 2007) , the detrimental impact in access to remedies must not be overlooked. (Ruggie Principles, 2011) . This in itself presents an issue as placing a subsidiary responsibility on the state to provide remedy, or to ensure that a remedy is enforced. Even aside from that, as we noted above, in the extraction industry, one of the key issues is that the governments collecting 'rents' from corporations tend to be 'weaker' due to systemic limitations and there tends to be a weaker civil society to encourage government's to participate. In enforcing remediation on states, those most affected (communities in lesser developed areas) may be those less able to use state frameworks to seek a remedy.
In terms of remedies themselves, the Ruggie Principles incorporate the language of human rights It is these types of reparations that go towards the more public accountability of MNCs (UNBPG, 2005) . Furthermore, remedies will only be effective through monitoring and enforcement at the regional or international level to ensure states are allowing individuals and communities to access redress against responsible MNCs, rather than as monetary leverage on vulnerable groups.
The experience of state compliance before the International Criminal Court indicates that having legislation and domestic mechanisms to hold private actors to account, albeit for individual criminal responsibility, is not always effective in ensuring accountability owing to weakness of the state, whether through its inability or unwillingness (Moffett, 2014 The Ruggie Principles do provide for National Contact Points (NCP) being utilised to enforce the principles. The NCP is defined as 'a government office responsible for encouraging observance of the Guidelines in a national context and for ensuring that the Guidelines are well known and understood by the national business community and by other interested parties' (National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises). Although referring specifically to the OECD Guidelines framework, there is some application here with regard to Ruggie. Whilst recognising the perceived importance of the NCP, we would stress how a country's individual needs can perhaps impact on the manner in which they 'commit' to such guidelines. This is of course difficult to gauge, especially giving the lack of monitoring of compliance and enforcement of international laws at the national level. In short, the value of the NCP seems to lie more in the publicising of the standard as opposed to ensuring compliance or to the enforcement of the remedial aspect of the principles (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002) .
There is also a disparity in the effectiveness of the NCP and the reports that arise as a result of investigations. Addressing the numbers of reports in relation to the OECD Guidelines for example, it becomes clear that the value of the NCP does differ depending on the state viewpoint. If then, there exists a disconnect in the use of the NCP on a transnational level, the effectiveness of the NCP as a means to hold MNCs accountable, or indeed to enforce remedies can be questioned. The Ruggie
Principles, in contextualising the three pillars, particularly remedies and enforcement, within the framework of the NCP has diluted the potential for obtaining remediation, but also the potential of the principles themselves.
The Ruggie Principles were designed with compromise in mind. Intent on bringing together business and governments, the Ruggie Principles sought middle ground, which, although gaining support from huge numbers of stakeholders, has stagnated the potential of the rights, responsibility and accountability discourse. The failure to articulate a strong framework for remediation, independent of the NCP, has diminished the potential of the principles as a viable mechanism to protect affected stakeholders/victims (Deva, 2013) . The value of the principles therefore lies in raising awareness of the need for effective remedy when corporations fail to adhere to their responsibilities. The enforcement of these remedies seems to lie beyond the remit of the existing UN framework. This is not to say that victims have received no remedy, numerous groups have initiated litigation against MNCs for failure to adhere to their responsibilities. The success of such litigation is limited (Zerk, 2014) . Lessons of accountability can be learnt from public international law in grasping the responsibility of MNCs beyond national borders.
III. Bridging the Private-Public Law Remedial Divide
A. Public law remediation and the energy extractive industry Public international law, in contrast to private law, is concerned with the obligations imposed on the state. Human rights law, in particular, has over the past two decades developed the notion of positive obligations on states to protect individuals, as well as to ensure mechanisms that can effectively investigate and remedy violations of human rights, even where they are committed by private actors.
As distinguished in the Ruggie Principles, the overriding principle is that the state is responsible for providing access to remedies to victims where private businesses commit abuses (Principle 25). As noted above, the Ruggie Principles, while not going as far as to find MNCs have human rights obligations, they recognise a responsibility to respect human rights and to provide remediation, or at least cooperation in such processes. Yet as Zerk (2014) against MNCs does allow victims the flexibility to spend the money as they see fit, as Grotius (1625) states 'money is the common measure of valuable things.' Yet damages can be insensitive in redressing gross violations of human rights, as it can be perceived as 'blood money' and reduces the value of human life and dignity to 'homo oeconomicus' (Loayza Tamayo v Peru, 1998, para. 9).
Where states have been found to commit gross violations of human rights, regional human rights Third, international or regional mechanisms are needed to monitor compliance of states with human rights obligations and to offer an alternative forum for redress for victims where they cannot access an effective remedy domestically, owing to the state's unwillingness or inability. MNCs are created to make profit and to promote private interests, thus self-regulation by companies' compliance with human rights norms is likely to be ineffective, as with CSR, as it is likely to be used to assist the company's business rather than social protection (McCorquodale, 2009, p. 391 & 394) . In contrast the state is supposed to protect its citizens and promote public interests, but due to its inability or Criminal Law Section represents willingness amongst some states to ensure such an avenue for redress.
We accept that what we are proposing in this article is ambitious. An international mechanism to hold MNCs to account for reparations is only the first step in shaping the regulatory structures that monitor corporate behaviour beyond nation state relations. This article has referred to 'inter'-national regulations and mechanisms. The term 'international' suggests some interaction between states (and indeed, this is something generally accepted in the literature). The MNCs that we are seeking to hold accountable are not 'inter'-national. They owe no loyalty to a particular state, region, people, or culture (Backer, 2007 (Backer, -2008 Sklair, 2001) . Instead, the purpose of their existence is to make profit.
They are transnational entities with relationships beyond state interplay, and indeed, states exist as mere external stakeholders. This in itself is not a negative, but recognises the limitations in influence that a state can have over corporate behaviour (Mitchell et. al., 1997) .
In terms of characterising governance development, there exists a pathway from regional-nationalfederal -international -transnational -global. Perhaps an international court of reparations and universal implementation of legislation to affect it in domestic courts could connect these governance pathways. We have stated throughout this piece that whereas the drivers of the global economy and governance discourse are MNCs (and thus operating at a transnational level), the regulatory mechanisms in place to regulate corporate behaviour are grounded at the predominately national/federal stage (Chimni, 2007) . Responsibility without accountability, via effective laws and sanctions, is an empty vessel. Responsibilities, before the mechanisms by which to hold them account have caught up, are irrelevant. We are proposing that the international level of regulations needs to be more robust in order to develop effect trans-or global -regulations, which are, ultimately the end goal in ensuring accountability and remediation for failure to adhere to obligations and responsibilities.
IV. Conclusion
This article focused on the failure of existing private and public legal frameworks in providing an effective remedy for victims/affected stakeholders where corporations violated either human rights, or indeed their own responsibilities as articulated in their CSR policy. Using the energy extraction industry as a vehicle to discuss this issue, we considered the value and scope of more integrated engagement with reparations on an international level. Initially looking at the responsibilities that corporations place on themselves via CSR we then considered its limitation in providing a remedy.
In terms of international norms and obligations, significant developments have been made in holding individuals within corporations to account from a criminal perspective. There have been less profound developments from a civil viewpoint. The Ruggie Principles (2011) evince the potential of a UN level guidance on responsibilities. Ruggie, in seeking to build consensus on the 2003 Norms, compromised on victims' right to remedy. This is not to say that litigation against the extraction industry does not exist. Mass torts and ATCA litigation, and the relative success in securing settlements (albeit no apologies etc.) are more a testament to the innovation of the human rights activists, than to the existing mechanisms in place by which to hold corporations to account (Zerk, 2013) . Although having provided some redress for victims/affected stakeholders, pathway to recovery has been severely limited in recent times with the decision in Kiobel (2013), in addition to procedural, jurisdictional and evidential limitations.
The changing nature of power and wealth in global terms, and the role MNCs can play in gross violations of human rights, reinforces the need to reconceptualise the traditional state-centred nature of responsibility in international law. Given the limited space for victims or external stakeholders of such violations seeking redress domestically, the international legal order may be a more efficient way of achieving accountability. Such a move perhaps also suggests taking the responsibility of MNCs more seriously, moving away from corporations defining the confines of responsibility and obligations on their terms, by bringing them into the fold of international responsibility and external accountability. In doing so, we believe that it would also recognise the shifts in the governance structure; recognising the limitations of using state level laws to hold multinational entities to account. This is not to substitute state obligations under international law or indeed its role and importance in protecting individuals and communities in its jurisdiction and upholding the public interest. Instead the state remains a guardian of society, with our suggested international court of reparations acting as a last resort where the state is unable or unwilling to provide victims access to remedies for gross violations of human rights. Responsibility for gross violations of human rights is conceived more pluralistically, including states and MNCs, with a subsidiary role of the state to provide reparations to victims where MNCs are unable to do so. Nor does such a scheme negate individual criminal responsibility for individuals within MNCs, where such gross violations satisfy the more narrowly defined international crimes. For victims of gross violations of human rights, recognising their legitimate claims to redress committed by MNCs as an international concern that should be effectively remedied, also broadens the notion of accountability, beyond the concern of individual states, to an international and universal one. By bridging the private-public divide, through recognising the responsibility of MNCs to provide remedies for gross violations of human rights, it could potentially offer an appropriate way of holding MNCs to account and to repair the harm caused in our endless pursuit for energy. Looking forward, how can we build on the Ruggie Principles to ensure justice for victims? An international court of reparations and universal jurisdiction over the responsibility of MNCs in domestic courts is potent way to make accountability meaningful.
